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ARGUMENT 
1 
No unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation 
occurred in this case under the United States or Utah constitutions where the 
County's highway dedication ordinance required dedication of property 
pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive "legislative" transportation 
scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific "adjudicative"decision. Thus, 
the Dolan "rough proportionality" test does not apply in this case, 
I his appeal presents a question of first impression for this court and, apparently, IO* M ^  
court in the United States1. Respotninii .mil I Yoss-Petitioner BAM Development, LLC 
["BAM"] essentially asserts, in its Opening Brief [" B \ M i »(- H i n«I," | (hat the analytical models 
set forth in the United States Supreme Court's Nollan and Dolan cases are "logically 
intertwined/' are "essentially inseparable" and "must be read together." Id., at 26. However, 
BAM offers no legal authority loi (hi assertion 
A key problem with BAM's analysis is ;:- i ^ quantity of the County's 
purported taking, as opposed to its quality. Stated otherwise, BAM is pre* KX'upu\\ w * lh degree 
rather than kind. Yet it is t! . :.. . >r quality, of the highway right-of-way dedication - not the 
degree to which it impacted ti W distinguishes this case from others. The exaction 
imposed here was the result of uniform application ofa i
 r;n ^  A ,K Jtion ordinance which 
. lies to all similarly situated land developers (i.e., those whose land f ^ i 
'The County has found no reported case addressing either the application of the 
Nollan and Dolan tests, or the distinction between legislative and adjudicative land use 
exactions, in the narrow context presented here, i.e., a highway right-of-way dedication 
imposed by ordinance on a developer whose property abuts an existing public road. 
Evidently, BAM has found so such cases either, inasmuch as its Opening Brief does not 
cite any such authority. 
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boundary with a highway). But BAM maintains that this analysis must be subject to the Do Ian 
"individualized determination" of "rough proportionality" between the exaction imposed as a 
condition of development approval and the nature and degree of the impact of the development. 
BAM's emphasis on equivalency in degree between exaction and impact is misguided. 
For instance, during the subdivision approval process, BAM did not object to the 
County's original requirement that BAM dedicate a 40-foot "half-width" right-of-way along 
the frontage of its land which abuts 3500 South street2. BAM did not protest until the County, 
after consultation with UDOT, increased the dedication from 40-feet to 53-feet3. Thus, BAM's 
claim on appeal, in effect, is that a required dedication for highway right-of-way of 40-feet is 
constitutionally permissible, but a dedication of 53-feet is not. Apparently, the additional 13-feet 
of right-of-way "crosses the line" into the realm of an uncompensated "taking" under the 5th 
Amendment and Art.l, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution. BAM's position is not supported by 
takings case law and is fundamentally arbitrary and illogical. 
More importantly, the County's requirement that BAM dedicate a portion of its property 
for highway right-of-way as a condition of development approval was the result of a general 
legislative prescription, not an individualized adjudicative decision. Together with the amicus 
curiae, BAM argues that the County's imposition of the highway dedication was applied as an 
2See, B.AM. Development v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 2004 UT App 34, f 2 
(Utah App. 2004). Also see the "Findings of Fact" entered by the trial court [R. 266 -
269] at Tflj 6 - 10. The trial court's factual findings are not challenged on appeal by either 
party. 
'Id.. 
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"administrative'"1 condition of the subdivision approval4. This contention is fundamentally 
flawed. Although ihr drdi. .mnn was applied at the administrative level, it was not an ad hoc 
"adjudicative" condition imposed by a Count y depm in irtit; rather it was the product of uniform 
transportation standards imposed by legislative enactor ?: : n is crucial to the 
Supreme ( omt's resolution of this case. 
While .in tml" uhud\:cd (i.e., ad hoc) development exaction should indeed require an 
individualized determination of the K i; if urn 4up betw een the exaction and the impact which the 
exaction seeks to remedy, the dedication of highway right-o(\\ »\ \nnpi * ..animi be held to the 
Dolan '" iiidi'i iduah/ed determination" .--P **«ou>ih proportionality" test becau- tl • • < av 
dedication requiremeni is hindjinicm... uniform and formulaic, not individualized, ni na 
operation. In other words, it applies iinitonnk i. an\ developer whose property abuts a 
highway affected by the County's transportation master pI;m I tins. I i, \ l""VI"'s Dolan argument 
a< • i rce a square factual peg into a round analytical hole. 
This "legislative vs ;p I indicative" issue is the threshold question here. For instance, 
when local building approvals are requested h\ d i M. I *»(tn s, exactions are sometimes established 
ad hoc based on unique characteristics of the development prop< i h ich it will 
be loca t n i i I n r . 111 A <»/Am, a public pedestrian walkway was imposed on the owner of" pn< "ate 
4See, Amicus Curiae Brief of the Utah State Property Rights Ombudsman at pp. 6 -
9. See also, BAM Op. Brief, pp. 34 - 42. There, BAM reverts to its original arguments in 
the trial court that the highway dedication violates equal protection and uniform operation 
of law protections. However, the trial court denied relief on these grounds, and these are 
not questions on which the Supreme Court has granted review here by certiorari. 
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beach property simply to connect two adjacent areas of public beaches5. The Coastal 
Commission found that the house which the plaintiffs proposed to build would block visual 
access to the beach and create a "psychological barrier" to its use by the public. This exaction 
clearly was tailored to the unique characteristics of the owner's property (i.e., blocking public 
view and beach access). Courts categorize such exactions as "adjudicative" local government 
decisions because they arise on an individualized (and frequently negotiated) basis, and are not 
the result of a general, universally-applied legislative regulations. 
Here, however, there was nothing about the unique characteristics of BAM's property 
that triggered the highway dedication. The dedication was based solely upon the fact that 
BAM's property shared a boundary line with a public highway - a fact that BAM knew when 
it acquired the property. It was not the size, shape, topography, geologic or environmental 
condition, visual impact, or any other unique characteristic of BAM's property which triggered 
the dedication requirement. Hence, the dedication was "legislative" rather than "adjudicative." 
The distinction between a "legislative" mandate and an "adjudicative" development 
condition is at the heart of this appeal. However, BAM's Opening Brief fails to address this 
issue at all. BAM seemingly avoids this critical distinction simply by insisting repeatedly (and 
without authority) that Dolan's "individualized determination -rough proportionality" test must 
apply to any development exaction, regardless of its kind or quality6. Yet BAM did not assert 
sNollan v. California Coastal Comm % 483 U.S. 825,841-842 (1987) 
6The amicus does, at least, address this distinction. He contends, however, that this 
case is distinguishable from the "legislative vs. adjudicative" cases cited in the County's 
PAGE 4 OF 15 
this stringent constitutional demand when the dedication requirement was only 40-feet, instead 
of 53-feet. BAM fails to explain how or why the additional 13-feet of required right-of-way 
dedication elevated this case to constitutional dimensions. Again, BAM focuses erroneously 
upon the degree (i.e., quantity) of the dedication, rather than its underlying source and character 
(i.e., legislative). 
The highway-dedication ordinance at issue here, involves a generally applicable 
legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is imposed - or which can be imposed -
individually. As with any developer who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a highway, 
BAM was required here to comply with a uniform legislative scheme which expects all 
similarly situated developers7 to dedicate highway rights-of-way consistent with current uniform 
road-width standards. Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that community 
development occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, 
under BAM's view of the law, road-width requirements for new construction along major 
traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and 
opening brief (q. v., at pp. 20 - 32) inasmuch as the latter cases "involv[ed] imposition of a 
general scheme of fees or regulations on development that are similar to general 
applications of local governmental police power," and not the "forced physical 
occupation of private property as a condition of development." Amicus Brief, pp. 8-9. 
In this regard, the amicus is correct. However, like BAM, the amicus does not cite any 
cases arising from highway right-of-way dedication statutes or ordinances, which further 
suggests that this issue - presented in this particular context - is a matter of first 
impression. 
7
"Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property which 
abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 15.28.010 
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other impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, an "individualized" 
impact analysis would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel located 
along the side of a highway. Rather than having roadways with even and consistent widths, 
road boundaries would be required to jut in and out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated 
by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's traffic impact. The absurd practical 
consequences of this application of Dolan "rough proportionality" in such a case are obvious. 
The exaction in this case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary assessment imposed on 
an individualized basis at the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors 
attributable exclusively to BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, 
the County highway-dedication ordinance 
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners who 
choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway [and] the 
assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not individualized, but 
rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable County Transportation 
Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners whose property abutted 
3500 South." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 [R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny on 
review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests." 
The County acknowledges that the Nollan "essential nexus" test is a valid requirement 
for constitutional analysis of a development exaction8. While the Court of Appeals' dissenting 
opinion found that the County's highway dedication ordinance passed the "essential nexus" 
8While the Nollan court devised the phrase "essential nexus" to distinguish its 
takings analysis from the "rational relationship"test evolved in its line of equal protection 
decisions, the phrases are functionally indistinguishable. 
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test9, the majority made no such direct finding, but held that Nollan and Dolan together provide 
the standard to be applied by the County "reviewing body" to which the case was to be 
remanded10. Thus, while an essential nexus should exist between a governmental interest and 
the nature of the development exaction which a political subdivision seeks to impose, it does 
not necessarily follow that the individualized "rough proportionality" requirement of Dolan 
must apply. BAM has not demonstrated a reasoned basis or legal authority for holding 
otherwise11. While the amicus points out that the cases cited by the County's Opening Brief12 
do not involve the "forced physical occupation of private property as a condition of 
development,"13 and while it is generally true that a physical occupation or invasion of property 
subjects an exaction to elevated takings scrutiny, neither the amicus nor BAM have provided 
any authority or argument that these cases should not apply here. The exactions upheld in these 
cases as "legislative" in character, rather than "adjudicative" - and therefore not subject to 
Dolan's "individualized determination - rough proportionality" analysis - generally involve 
payment of impact fees or similar economic assessment. However, these cases focus on the 
9
 BAM Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 729-730, 2004 UT 
App34ffl[58-62. 
10Jtf.,atf 16. 
nBAM's Opening Brief does not respond to the line of cases offered by the County 
which examined the "legislative vs. adjudicative" character of various exactions and 
declined to hold that they amounted to a "taking." 
nQ.q.v., at pp. 20 - 33, and n.l 1. 
13Amicus Brief, p. 8 - 9. 
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character of the exaction as a legislatively uniform requirement, not whether the exaction 
deprived the landowner of money, as opposed to land. 
In short, neither BAM nor the amicus has established a sound legal basis for disregarding 
the "legislative vs. adjudicative" distinction here. This is not a case in which the County 
exercised ad hoc adjudicative discretion in response to the site-specific characteristics of 
BAM's land as occurred in Nollan and Dolan. As the Arizona Supreme Court held in Home 
Builders Ass fn of Central Arizona v. City ofScottsdale, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997), 
"[the Dolan court] was careful to point out that a city's adjudicative decision to 
impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an individual case," 
[but] "[b]ecause the Scottsdale case involves a generally applicable legislative 
decision by the city, the court of appeals [below] thought Dolan did not apply. 
We agree, though the question has not been settled by the [United States] 
Supreme Court." 
This issue may yet be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, the trend 
in lower courts appears to favor recognition of the legislative vs. adjudicative dichotomy where, 
as here, an exaction follows a uniform legislative formula. This rationale operates 
independently of whether the exaction takes the form of land or money. The result should be 
that only the Nollan prong of the so-called "Nollan/Dolan" analysis should be applied while the 
Dolan prong should be reserved for discretionary "adjudicative" land-use decisions by 
government. And, even Judge Orme's dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals decision, 
which would have ruled for BAM, acknowledges that the Nollan "essential nexus" test is 
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satisfied in this case14. Accordingly, this court should find that (a) the "essential nexus" test of 
Nollan must be, and here has been, met; and (b) the Dolan "individualized determination- rough 
proportionality" test does not apply to the uniform legislative scheme embodied by the County's 
highway-dedication ordinance. 
2 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the district court's review is 
generally limited to the administrative record pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
Sec. 17-27-1001. 
The amicus offers an impassioned argument for reversal of the "administrative hearing 
and record" requirement of the Court of Appeals decision15. His argument focuses chiefly upon 
the practical impact of repetitive administrative proceedings and resulting "cost, delay and 
hassle" for citizens. 
The Court of Appeals' decision effectively remands this litigation to the County 
administrative process to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing on BAM's administrative appeal, 
and to create a record thereof. The County maintains that the Court of Appeals' majority 
analysis of Utah Code, Sec. 17-27-1001 as requiring a county or municipality to conduct 
appropriate hearing and recordmaking in appeals of certain land use decisions is a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute. However, as discussed in Argument 3, infra, this holding only 
UBAM. Development LLC v. Salt Lake County, supra, 87 P.3d at 730-731, 2005 
UTApp23at1J62. 
l5See, e.g., Amicus Brief, pp. 16-21. BAM's opening brief, on the other hand, 
does not substantively address the "administrative remand" issue at all. 
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applies in appeals which - unlike this one - are not asserted as a "'constitutional takings issue" 
under Utah Code, Sec. 63-90a-41. 
In such cases, the decision below simply requires that a County must provide an 
opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing to be conducted, and a record thereof to be created. 
In accordance with Sec. 27-17-1001 and, by analogy to Sec. 17-27-708, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that the district court's review is limited to a review of the official administrative 
record generated before the appropriate county hearing officer or panel. This interpretation of 
Sec. 1001 will actually reduce the delays and expenses of traditional litigation, redundant or 
inconsistent adjudicative proceedings. The requirement of an administrative hearing and 
record also allows a county or municipality to review the rationale of its own agency decisions 
where contested by an affected citizen. Thus, the "administrative hearing and recordmaking" 
requirement read into Sec. 1001 by the Court of Appeals promote sound public policy and 
judicial economy. If properly implemented, this requirement will provide for a single recorded 
land-use administrative appeal hearing, and will actually avoid repetitive, time-consuming and 
costly administrative reviews. 
However, as discussed in the County's Opening Brief16, the Court of Appeals' decision 
is valid as far as it goes, but does not apply to this case because Utah statute carves out a 
specific exception - effectively providing for a direct action in the district court - for those 
challenges asserted as "constitutional takings issues" under Sec. 63-90a-4. 
l6County's Opening Brief at 38-40. 
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3 
Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits filing of an action on a 
"constitutional taking issue"regardless of the state of the administrative 
record. 
BAM correctly argues that the Court of Appeals' decision "overlooked" the application 
of Sec. 63-90a-4 to this case17. It is true that the Court of Appeals did not discuss the 
application of Sec. 63-90a-4. However, this is because BAM never raised this issue in the 
Court of Appeals. Thus, the County objects to Supreme Court consideration of this issue on the 
ground that the issue was Sec. 63-90a-4 was not properly preserved below. BAM argues that 
application of Sec. 63-90a-4 arose from the Court of Appeals' decision which developed the 
"administrative hearing and record" issue sua sponte, not at the suggestion of either party. 
However, BAM then erroneously states that 
"[e]ven when the obvious applicability of Section 63-90a-4 was brought to the 
Court of Appeals' attention (in the context of the 'petition for rehearing'), the 
Court of Appeals ultimately declined to consider the same." 
BAM Op. Brief at 46. Thus, BAM implies that it raised Sec. 63-90a-4 in its Petition for 
17BAM Op. Brief, p. 46. BAM scolds the County for "changing its tune" with 
respect to the applicability of Sec. 63-90a-4 to this case between its petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and its Opening Brief Id., p. 46, n. 6. The County apologizes for any 
confusion on this issue. However, after further research and analysis, it appeared that 
Sec. 63-90a-4 would indeed apply to BAM's "constitutional takings" claim, thereby 
exempting BAM from the usual administrative appeal and exhaustion requirements - // 
BAM had properly presented this issue on appeal. That said, the County still maintains 
(as its response to BAM's petition for certiorari is quoted by BAM) that "there is actually 
no 'conflict' at all between Sec. 63-90a-4, and the interpretation of Sec. 17-27-2001 given 
by the Court of Appeals." Indeed, there is no "conflict" because these statutes apply to 
two different classes of land-use appeals: the first, to "constitutional takings issues," the 
latter, to appeals of all other land-use decisions. 
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Rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals on March 5,2004. In actuality, BAM never mentioned 
Sec. 63-90a-4 in its Petition for Rehearing. In twenty-three pages of argument for rehearing, 
BAM exhaustively reargued its case, but nowhere did it invoke the provisions of Sec. 63-90a-4. 
Thus, BAM should be precluded from raising the issue of Sec. 63-90a-4 first the first time in 
this court. 
However, if the Supreme Court chooses to consider this issue on its merits 
notwithstanding the lack of preservation below, it appears that Sec. 63-90a-4 applies to this 
case. That statute, entitled "Constitutional Taking Issues," provides that political subdivisions 
are required to adopt the type of administrative review of constitutional takings claims 
contemplated by the County's "takings relief ordinance discussed in the County's Opening 
Brief See, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90a-3. The County's takings relief procedure provides 
a method by which an aggrieved citizen may seek plenary judicial review of a constitutional 
takings claim. Then, Sec. 63-90a-4 allows to a citizen to seek judicial relief while bypassing 
the political subdivision's administrative takings relief review provided as an option by the 
statute. So long as a property owner denominates his or her objection to a county or municipal 
land-use decision as a "constitutional taking issue, " the claim may bypass the administrative 
process and be filed directly in district court. Accordingly, subject to the preservation objection 
discussed above, the County acknowledges that inasmuch as BAM's claim was asserted as a 
"constitutional taking issue," it was properly heard and decided in the district court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The highway dedication ordinance in this case, which involves a uniform and 
comprehensive "legislative"scheme, presents what appears to be a constitutional issue of first 
impression to this court. The "takings" analysis requiring an "individualized determination" of 
"rough proportionality" developed in the U.S. Supreme Court'sDolan decision is not applicable 
in this case. The Dolan "rough proportionality" standard does not apply to a generally-applied 
legislative land-use scheme, as occurred here. The County ordinance at issue here applied 
equally and even-handedly to developers of all highway-abutting land, and was not the product 
of an "ad hoc" individualized discretionary (i.e., "adjudicative") act. Therefore, while the 
ordinance should - and does - satisfy the "essential nexus" test of Nollan, it is not subject to 
the Dolan "rough proportionality" test. Even the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals 
decision, which would have ruled for BAM, acknowledges that the "essential nexus" test is 
satisfied in this case. 
Although the Court of Appeals properly interpreted Sec. 17-27-1001 as limiting district 
court review of a land use decision appeal to the administrative record, this limitation does not 
apply to appeals involving a "constitutional takings issue," as this case does, pursuant to the 
provisions of Sec. 63-90a-4. Thus, routine land use appeals which do not present constitutional 
takings issues should be subject to the "administrative hearing and record" requirement 
established by the Court of Appeals as a prerequisite to district court review. However, this 
case does raise a constitutional takings issue. Accordingly, if the Supreme Court elects to 
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consider Sec. 63-90a-4, even though it has never been raised below, then this action was 
properly brought and tried in the district. 
Accordingly, the County respectfully submits that this court should find that (a) the 
"essential nexus" test of Nollan must be, and here has been, met; and (b) the Dolan 
"individualized determination- rough proportionality" test does not apply to the uniform 
legislative scheme embodied by the County's highway-dedication ordinance. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 2005. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DONtEB-fiTHANSEN 
Depuiy District Attorney 
PAGE 14 OF 15 
•k "k k * •k 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND CROSS-
RESPONDENT SALT LAKE COUNTY was mailed by U.S. First Class Mail, postage 
prepaid (2 copies each) to: 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan UT 84088 
Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. Development, LLC 
Craig M. Call 
Property Rights Ombudsman 
1594 W. No. Temple St., Ste. 3170 
PO Box 145610 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-5610 
Amicus Curiae 
On this VL day of T e W ^ - *] , 200 S . 
^ 
PAGE 15 OF 15 
